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Abstract
We introduce a new measure of information-theoretic secrecy based on rate-distortion theory and study it in
the context of the Shannon cipher system. Whereas rate-distortion theory is traditionally concerned with a single
reconstruction sequence, in this work we suppose that an eavesdropper produces a list of 2nRL reconstruction sequences
and measure secrecy by the minimum distortion over the entire list. We show that this setting is equivalent to one
in which an eavesdropper must reconstruct a single sequence, but also receives side information about the source
sequence and public message from a rate-limited henchman (a helper for an adversary). We characterize the optimal
tradeoff of secret key rate, list rate, and eavesdropper distortion. The solution hinges on a problem of independent
interest: lossy compression of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook. We also characterize the
solution to the lossy communication version of the problem in which distortion is allowed at the legitimate receiver.
The analysis in both settings is greatly aided by a recent technique for proving source coding results with the use of
a likelihood encoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
A ubiquitous model in information-theoretic secrecy is the Shannon cipher system [2] in which two nodes who
share secret key want to communicate losslessly in the presence of an eavesdropper. As depicted in Figure 1,
Node A views an i.i.d. source sequence Xn and uses the shared secret key K that is independent of the source to
produce an encrypted message M . Node B uses the message and the key to produce Xˆn. An eavesdropper views
the message and knows the scheme that Nodes A and B employ.
Also ubiquitous is the investigation of how to measure secrecy when there is not enough key to ensure perfect
secrecy, i.e. when the key rate is less than the entropy of the information source. One potential solution, proposed
by Yamamoto in [3], is to measure secrecy by the distortion that an eavesdropper incurs in attempting to reconstruct
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Fig. 1: The Shannon cipher system with secret key rate R0 and communication rate R. In this paper, we measure secrecy by
the minimum distortion in a list of reconstruction sequences {Zn(1), . . . , Zn(2nRL)} that the eavesdropper produces.
the source sequence. In accordance with the usual constructs in rate-distortion theory, this means that Nodes A and
B want to maximize the following expression over all possible codes:
min
zn(m)
P[d(Xn, zn(M)) ≥ D]. (1)
Although this seems like a reasonable objective at first glance, it was shown in [4] that simple codes employing
negligible rates of secret key can force this probability to one, regardless of the distortion level D. The reason
for this disconcerting result is that the accompanying secrecy guarantees can be fragile, as the following example
elucidates. Let Xn be i.i.d. Bern(1/2) and suppose that there is just one bit of secret key, i.e. K ∈ {0, 1}. Encrypt by
transmitting Xn itself if K = 0 and Xn with all its bits flipped if K = 1. In this scenario, any optimal reconstruction
Zn that the eavesdropper produces has expected hamming distortion equal to 1/2, the highest expected distortion
that the eavesdropper could possibly incur. Despite this, the eavesdropper actually knows quite a bit about Xn,
namely that it is one of two sequences. Indeed, the guarantee of secrecy is rather fragile because if the eavesdropper
learns just one bit of the source sequence, then the entire sequence is compromised.
In view of the previous example, one way to strengthen a distortion-based measure of secrecy is to design schemes
around the assumption that the eavesdropper has access to some side information. In [4], this is accomplished by
supposing that eavesdropper views the causal behavior of the system; in particular, the eavesdropper reconstructs
Zi based on Xi−1 and the public message M .
In this paper, we study another distortion-based approach to measuring secrecy in the Shannon cipher system.
Instead of requiring a single reconstruction sequence Zn, we suppose that the eavesdropper produces a list of
2nRL reconstructions {Zn(1), . . . , Zn(2nRL)} and consider the minimum distortion over the entire list. This is
somewhat reminiscent of equivocation (i.e., the conditional entropy H(Xn|M)), which also purports to measure
the uncertainty of the eavesdropper. However, an important difference in the measure we study is that the structure
of the uncertainty is built directly into the definition. The eavesdropper’s equivocation merely provides a lower
bound on the size of the smallest list that contains the exact source sequence Xn. On the other hand, the optimal
tradeoff between secret key rate, distortion, and list rate will give us a function RL(R0, D) that precisely quantifies
the size of the smallest list that an eavesdropper is able to produce that reliably contains a sequence of distortion
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Quantifying secrecy in terms of lists and distortion has been done previously in [5] and [6], where the eavesdropper
is modeled as a “guessing wiretapper” who produces a sequence of reconstructions. After each estimate, the
eavesdropper receives feedback about whether or not the reconstruction was within a certain distortion level.1
As soon as the distortion level is reached, the eavesdropper stops guessing; the moments of the number of guesses
needed indicate the secrecy of the system. Our approach differs from these works in that there is no sequential
guessing (no testing mechanism) and the list size is fixed.
Organization
This paper considers the list-reconstruction measure of secrecy and establishes the information-theoretic characteri-
zation of the optimal tradeoffs among the secret key rate, list rate, and distortion at the eavesdropper. We divide the
paper into two parts. First, we introduce and solve the problem when lossless communication is required between the
legitimate parties (Sections II–V). We then introduce the lossy communication setting and solve the corresponding
problem (Sections VI–VIII), reusing components from the preceding sections where possible. Although the lossy
communication setting is a generalization of the lossless setting, there are several complications and subtleties that
emerge that warrant the separation. For example, the converse proof is much more involved in the lossy setting.
In Section II, we formally define the list-based measure of secrecy and the lossless communication setting in which
it will be first be analyzed. We also give an equivalent reformulation of the setting in terms of a malicious helper
for the eavesdropper; the resulting “henchman problem” becomes the default formulation for the remainder of the
paper. Section III contains Theorem 1, the characterization of the optimal tradeoffs in the lossless communication
setting. The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in Section IV (converse) and Section V (achievability). In Section VI,
we introduce the lossy communication version of the problem and characterize the optimal tradeoffs in Theorem 3.
The converse and achievability proofs of Theorem 3 are given in Sections VII and VIII, respectively.
In addition to being a treatment of a new measure of secrecy for the Shannon cipher system, this paper is an
endorsement of the efficacy of a likelihood encoder for proving source coding results. As detailed in [7], a likelihood
encoder is a particular stochastic encoder which, when combined with a random codebook, manages to avoid many
of the tedious and technical components of achievability proofs in lossy compression problems. The primary conduit
for the analysis of a likelihood encoder is the “soft covering lemma”, which is expounded upon in [8]. In our case,
the technique allows us to extract an idealized subproblem from the crucial part of the achievability proof and
consider it independently of the original problem. The subproblem concerns the lossy compression of a codeword
drawn uniformly from a random codebook.
1In [5], the feedback concerns exact reconstructions, whereas [6] allows a distortion parameter.
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4II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
All alphabets (e.g., X , Y , and Z) are finite. The set {1, . . . ,m} is sometimes denoted by [m]. Given a per-letter
distortion measure d(x, z), we abuse notation slightly by defining
d(xn, zn) , 1
n
n∑
i=1
d(xi, zi). (2)
We also assume that for every x ∈ X , there exists z ∈ Z such that d(x, z) = 0.
We denote the empirical distribution (or type) of a sequence xn by Txn :
Txn(x) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{x = xi}. (3)
B. Total variation distance
Throughout the paper, we make frequent use of the total variation distance between two probability measures P
and Q with common alphabet, defined by
‖P −Q‖TV , sup
A∈F
|P (A)−Q(A)|. (4)
The following properties of total variation distance are quite useful.
Property 1. Total variation distance satisfies:
(a) If the support of P and Q is a countable set X , then
‖P −Q‖TV = 1
2
∑
x∈X
|P ({x})−Q({x})|. (5)
(b) Let ε > 0 and let f(x) be a function with bounded range of width b > 0. Then
‖P −Q‖TV < ε =⇒
∣∣EP f(X)− EQf(X)∣∣ < εb, (6)
where EP indicates that the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution P .
(c) Let PXPY |X and QXPY |X be two joint distributions with common channel PY |X . Then
‖PXPY |X −QXPY |X‖TV = ‖PX −QX‖TV. (7)
(d) Let PX and QX be marginal distributions of PXY and QXY . Then
‖PX −QX‖TV ≤ ‖PXY −QXY ‖TV. (8)
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5C. Problem setup
As shown in Figure 1, Node A observes a source sequence Xn that is i.i.d. according to a distribution PX . Nodes
A and B share common randomness K ∈ [2nR0 ] that is uniformly distributed and independent of Xn. Node A
sends a message M to Node B over a noiseless channel at rate R.
Definition 1. An (n,R,R0) code consists of:
Encoder: f : Xn × [2nR0 ]→ [2nR] (9)
Decoder: g : [2nR]× [2nR0 ]→ Xn (10)
The encoder and decoder can be stochastic (in which case they are denoted by PM |Xn,K and PX̂n|M,K).
The encrypted communication (the message M ) is overheard perfectly by an eavesdropper who produces a list
L(M) ⊂ Zn and incurs the minimum distortion over the entire list:
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn). (11)
Using the secret key and the noiseless channel, Nodes A and B want to communicate losslessly while ensuring that
the eavesdropper’s optimal strategy suffers distortion above a given level with high probability. The generalization
to lossy communication begins in Section VI.
Definition 2. The tuple (R,R0, RL, D) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (n,R,R0) codes such that the
error probability P[Xn 6= X̂n] vanishes and, ∀ε > 0,
min
L(m):|L|≤2nRL
P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn) ≥ D − ε
]
n→∞−−−−→ 1. (12)
Thus, we allow the eavesdropper to use any list-valued function L :M→ {Zn}2nRL1 , provided the cardinality of
the range satisfies |L| ≤ 2nRL . Furthermore, we assume that the eavesdropper knows the (n,R,R0) code and the
distribution PX .
D. The henchman problem
So far, the problem has been formulated in terms of an eavesdropper who produces a list of 2nRL reconstructions.
It turns out that we can relate this formulation to one in which an eavesdropper reconstructs a single sequence; this
is accomplished by supplying the eavesdropper with a rate-limited helper (a henchman). As depicted in Figure 2,
the eavesdropper receives nRL bits of side information from a henchman who has access to the source sequence
Xn and the public message M . Since the eavesdropper and henchman cooperate, this means that the eavesdropper
effectively receives the best possible nRL bits of side information about the pair (Xn,M) to assist in producing a
single reconstruction sequence Zn.
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Fig. 2: The henchman problem. A rate-limited henchman has access to the source sequence and the public message. The
eavesdropper produces a single reconstruction sequence Zn based on the public message and the side information from the
henchman.
Definition 3. The tuple (R,R0, RL, D) is achievable in the henchman problem if there exists a sequence of
(n,R,R0) codes such that the error probability P[Xn 6= X̂n] vanishes and, ∀ε > 0,
min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
P
[
d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D − ε
]
n→∞−−−−→ 1. (13)
Thus, we allow the eavesdropper and henchman to jointly design a code consisting of an encoder mH(xn,m) and a
decoder zn(m,mH), subject to the constraint |MH| ≤ 2nRL . It can be shown that allowing a stochastic encoder or
decoder does not decrease the eavesdropper’s distortion. As in Definition 2, we assume that the adversarial entities
are aware of the scheme that Nodes A and B employ, although this is not explicitly indicated in (13).
We now demonstrate the equivalence of the list reconstruction problem and the henchman problem.
Proposition 1. The tuple (R,R0, RL, D) is achievable in the list reconstruction problem if and only if it is achievable
in the henchman problem. In other words, Definitions 2 and 3 are equivalent.
Proof: It is enough to show that the eavesdropper’s scheme in the list reconstruction problem can be transformed
to a scheme in the henchman problem that achieves the same (or less) distortion, and vice versa.
Let L(m) be the function that the eavesdropper uses to produce a list of reconstruction sequences. If the public
message is M , the list L(M) can act as a codebook in the henchman problem. Knowing (Xn,M), the henchman
can transmit the index of the sequence in L(M) with the lowest distortion. Upon receiving the index and M , the
eavesdropper reconstructs the corresponding sequence.
Conversely, suppose that the henchman and eavesdropper have devised an encoder mH(xn,m) and a decoder
zn(m,mH). Upon observing the public message, the eavesdropper has a list of codewords (one for each mH) that
can be used for the list reconstruction problem. More precisely, the eavesdropper forms the list
L(M) = {zn(M,mH)}mH∈[2nRL ]. (14)
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7In both cases, it is straightforward to verify that the transformation maintains (or decreases) the distortion. To carry
out the verification formally, it is enough to show that for any (n,R,R0) code,
min
L(m):|L|≤2nRL
P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn) ≥ D
]
= min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
P
[
d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D
]
. (15)
To show (≥), fix a list reconstruction function L(m) and define a henchman encoder and eavesdropper decoder by
mH(x
n,m) = argmin
j∈[2nRL ]
d(xn,L(m, j)) (16)
zn(m,mH) = L(m,mH), (17)
where L(m, j) denotes the jth element of the list L(m). Then we have
P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn) ≥ D
]
= P
[
d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D
]
(18)
≥ min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
P
[
d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D
]
. (19)
To show (≤), fix a henchman encoder mH(xn,m) and eavesdropper decoder zn(m,mH) and define a list recon-
struction function by
L(m) = {zn(m,mH)}mH∈[2nRL ]. (20)
Then we have
P
[
d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D
]
≥ P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn) ≥ D
]
(21)
≥ min
L(m):|L|≤2nRL
P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
d(Xn, zn) ≥ D
]
. (22)
III. MAIN RESULT (LOSSLESS COMMUNICATION)
When lossless communication is required between the legitimate parties, we have the following characterization
of the tradeoff among the communication rate, secret key rate, list rate (or henchman rate), and eavesdropper’s
distortion.
Theorem 1. Given a source distribution PX and a distortion function d(x, z), the closure of achievable tuples
(R,R0, RL, D) is the set of tuples satisfying
R ≥ H(X)
D ≤ D(RL) · 1{R0 > RL},
(23)
where D(·) is the point-to-point distortion-rate function:
D(R) , min
PZ|X :R≥I(X;Z)
E[d(X,Z)]. (24)
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8Fig. 3: The region in Theorem 1 for source distribution PX ∼ Bern(1/2) and distortion measure d(x, z) = 1{x 6= z}.
Perhaps the most striking part of Theorem 1 is that the region is discontinuous. Fixing a rate of secret key R0,
observe that when the list rate RL is strictly less than R0, the (RL, D) tradeoff follows the point-to-point rate-
distortion function. However, as soon as RL equals or exceeds the secret key rate, the eavesdropper’s distortion
drops to zero (the minimum distortion possible) because all possible decryptions can be enumerated in a list of
size 2nR0 . Figure 3 illustrates Theorem 1 for a Bern(1/2) source and hamming distortion; the communication rate
is assumed to satisfy R ≥ H(X) and has no effect on the (R0, RL, D) tradeoff.
Note that setting RL = 0 in the region of Theorem 1 corresponds to requiring a single reconstruction (without a
henchman), which was Yamamoto’s original formulation of the problem in [3]. In this case, we see that any positive
rate of secret key results in distortion D(0), the maximum expected distortion that can occur.
In the context of the list reconstruction formulation, Theorem 1 implies that when Nodes A and B act optimally
and RL < R0, the eavesdropper’s best strategy is to simply ignore the public message and list the codewords from a
good point-to-point rate-distortion codebook. In particular, the public message is useless to the eavesdropper in this
regime. However, when RL ≥ R0, the eavesdropper uses a different strategy and produces all possible decryptions
of the public message. When we consider the lossy communication setting, we will see that a similar strategy switch
occurs.
We now prove the achievability and converse portions of Theorem 1. For the entirety of the proof, we use the
henchman formulation instead of the list reconstruction one. The main idea in the proof of achievability concerns
the problem of compressing codewords from a random codebook beyond the rate-distortion limit; the proof also
relies on a likelihood encoder [7] and the soft covering lemma [8, Lemma IV.1]. The converse is straightforward,
as we now show.
October, 2014 DRAFT
9IV. CONVERSE (LOSSLESS COMMUNICATION)
The constraint R ≥ H(X) is a consequence of the lossless source coding theorem. The constraint on D splits
into two cases depending on the relation between R0 and RL. If RL ≥ R0, then any scheme that Nodes A and B
use to achieve lossless compression can be exploited by the eavesdropper and the henchman. Since they can both
enumerate the 2nR0 possible decryptions of M , the henchman can simply send the index of the correct decryption,
which results in zero distortion. On the other hand, if RL < R0 then the eavesdropper and the henchman can
ignore M altogether and simply use a point-to-point rate-distortion code to describe Xn within distortion D(RL).
Therefore, regardless of the code that Alice and Bob use for lossless communication, the eavesdropper and the
henchman can achieve distortion less than or equal to D(RL) · 1{R0 > RL}.
V. ACHIEVABILITY (LOSSLESS COMMUNICATION)
Viewing the problem from the perspective of the adversarial entities, we see that the henchman observes the pair
(Xn,M) and encodes a message MH, and the eavesdropper observes (M,MH) and decodes Zn; their goal is to
minimize the distortion d(Xn, Zn). This describes the usual rate-distortion setting with additional information M
available at encoder and decoder. In other words, for a given M = m, the henchman observes a sequence Xn
drawn from a source distribution PXn|M=m and describes the sequence to the eavesdropper using a rate-limited
channel; the conditional distribution PXn|M=m is the effective source distribution because both the henchman and
the eavesdropper know the public message.
Observing that PXn|M=m is induced entirely by the actions of Node A, let us assume for the moment that Node A
uses the following random binning scheme to encode the source sequence. First, randomly divide the set of typical
xn sequences into bins of size 2nR0 . This binning is known to everyone, including the adversaries. To encode
Xn, Node A transmits the message M = (Mp,Ms), where Mp is the bin containing Xn, and Ms is the index
within that bin, one-time padded with K. Note that the one-time pad renders Ms statistically independent of Xn
and Ms. Thus, for this choice of encoder, the induced distribution PXn|M corresponds to choosing a sequence
roughly uniformly at random from bin Mp (because of the asymptotic equipartition property). Furthermore, the
asymptotic equipartition property and the randomness of the binning suggest that the 2nR0 sequences in bin Mp
were approximately chosen i.i.d. according to
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). Therefore, very roughly speaking, the random binning
scheme results in a distribution PXn|M=m that corresponds to selecting a sequence uniformly from a random
codebook whose codewords are generated independently and identically according to
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). If this is true,
then the joint goal of the henchman and the eavesdropper becomes the following: lossy compression (at rate RL)
of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook of size 2nR0 . We now delve into this subproblem, the
conclusion of which is the following: if RL < R0, then with high probability it is impossible to achieve distortion
less than D(RL).
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A. Interlude: lossy compression of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook
Consider a codebook cx = {xn(1), . . . , xn(2nRC)} consisting of 2nRC sequences. Select a codeword uniformly at
random from cx and denote it by xn(J), where J ∼ Unif[2nRC ]. An encoder describes xn(J) using a noiseless
link of rate R, and a decoder estimates it with a reconstruction sequence Zn. Both the encoder and decoder know
the codebook cx. Notice that the relationship between this setting and the standard rate-distortion framework is that
the input space is contracted from Xn to a codebook cx, and the source sequence is chosen uniformly at random
from cx instead of i.i.d. according to a distribution PX .
Definition 4. For a fixed codebook cx ⊆ Xn, define an (n, cx, R) code as an encoder f : Xn × cx → [2nR] and a
decoder g : [2nR]× cx → Zn.
For a given D and fixed codebook cx, the encoder and decoder want to maximize the probability that the distortion
between xn(J) and Zn is less than D:
max
(n,cx,R) codes
P[d(xn(J), Zn) ≤ D]. (25)
Instead of considering this objective for arbitrary codebooks, we generate a random codebook Cx in which the
codewords are drawn independently, each according to
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). The setup is depicted in Figure 4.
In some regimes, the expression in (25) approaches one as blocklength increases. For example, if R ≥ RC then
the encoder can simply send the index of Xn(J) within the codebook Cx, thus ensuring zero distortion. Another
example is when R ≥ R(D), in which case distortion D is achievable even without knowledge of Cx, because
Xn(J) is i.i.d. according to PX .
The regime we are interested in is when R < RC and R < R(D). In this case, we find that with high probability
(over the random codebook) it is impossible to achieve distortion D, i.e., the expression in (25) vanishes.
Theorem 2. Fix R, RC and D. Let Cx be a random codebook of 2nRC codewords, each drawn independently
according to
∏n
i=1 PX(xi). Let τn be any sequence that converges to zero sub-exponentially fast (i.e., τn = 2
−o(n)).
If
R < min{R(D), RC}, (26)
then
lim
n→∞PCx
[
max
(n,Cx,R) codes
P[d(Xn(J), Zn) ≤ D] > τn
]
= 0. (27)
Proof:
We first provide a brief, informal sketch of the proof idea. For an optimal (n, Cx, R) code, there are on average
2n(RC−R) codewords in Cx that map to each of the 2nR reconstruction sequences in Zn. However, for a given
October, 2014 DRAFT
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Xn(J) Enc. Dec. Zn
Cx
R
Fig. 4: Lossy compression of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook Cx = {Xn(1), . . . , Xn(2nRC)}. Both
the encoder and decoder know the codebook Cx, and the encoder must describe a randomly chosen codeword Xn(J), where
J ∼ Unif[2nRC ].
reconstruction sequence zn, there are only (on average) 2n(RC−R(D)) sequences in Cx within distortion D of
zn, because the probability of an i.i.d sequence Xn being within distortion D of zn is roughly 2−nR(D). Since
2n(RC−R(D)) is much smaller than 2n(RC−R), the probability that zn yields distortion less than D is vanishingly
small. In fact, this probability decays doubly exponentially, which means that the entire suite of 2nR reconstruction
sequences simultaneously yields distortion greater than D with high probability. In other words, the optimal code
gives rise to distortion greater than D with high probability, which is what we want to show.
The first step is to restrict Xn(J) to the δ-typical set T nδ (X) by writing
P[d(Xn(J), Zn) ≤ D] ≤ P[d(Xn(J), Zn) ≤ D,A] + P[Ac], (28)
where A denotes the event {Xn(J) ∈ T nδ }. The δ-typical set is defined according to the notion of strong typicality:
T nδ (X) , {xn ∈ Xn : ‖Txn − PX‖TV < δ}, (29)
where Txn denotes the empirical distribution (i.e., the type) of xn. We will choose an appropriate δ later. Note that
the second term in (28) vanishes in the limit for any δ > 0 since Xn(J) is i.i.d. according to PX .
Although we defined a (n, Cx, R) code as an encoder-decoder pair (f, g), we will benefit from viewing a code as
the combination of a codebook of zn sequences and an encoder that is optimal for that codebook. In other words,
treat an (n, Cx, R) code as a codebook cz ⊆ Zn of size 2nR, together with an encoder that maps xn ∈ Cx to the
zn ∈ cz with the lowest distortion d(xn, zn). This allows us to write
max
(n,Cx,R) codes
P[d(Xn(J), Zn) ≤ D,A]
= max
cz(Cx)
P
[
min
zn∈cz(CX)
d(Xn(J), zn) ≤ D,A
]
, (30)
where the notation cz(Cx) emphasizes that cz is a function of the random codebook Cx; for simplicity, we suppress
the n and R parameters of cz(Cx).
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Now we apply a union bound to the right-hand side of (30) and write
P
[
min
zn∈cz(Cx)
d(Xn(J), zn) ≤ D,A
] (a)
≤
∑
zn∈cz(Cx)
P
[
d(Xn(J), zn) ≤ D,A
]
(31)
≤ 2nR max
zn∈cz(Cx)
P
[
d(Xn(J), zn) ≤ D,A
]
(32)
≤ 2nR max
zn∈Zn
P
[
d(Xn(J), zn) ≤ D,A
]
(33)
(b)
= 2−n(RC−R) max
zn∈Zn
2nRC∑
j=1
1{d(Xn(j), zn) ≤ D,Xn(j) ∈ T nδ }, (34)
where step (a) is a union bound, and step (b) uses the fact that Xn(J) is chosen uniformly from Cx. Notice that
for a fixed zn, the terms in the sum in (34) are i.i.d. random variables (due to the nature of the random codebook
construction), which we henceforth denote by ξj,zn :
ξj,zn , 1{d(Xn(j), zn) ≤ D,Xn(j) ∈ T nδ }, j = 1, . . . , 2nRC . (35)
Using the equality in (30) and the bound in (34), we have
P
[
max
(n,Cx,R) codes
P[d(Xn(J), Zn) ≤ D,A] > τn
]
≤ P
[
max
zn∈Zn
2nRC∑
j=1
ξj,zn > τn2
n(RC−R)
]
(36)
(a)
≤ |Z|n max
zn∈Zn
P
[ 2nRC∑
j=1
ξj,zn > τn2
n(RC−R)
]
, (37)
where (a) is a union bound. If we can show that the probability in (37) decays doubly exponentially fast with n,
then the proof will be complete. To that end, we first use a standard application of the method of types [9] to
establish a bound on the expected value of ξj,zn in the following lemma. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1. If Xn is i.i.d. according to PX , then for any zn,
P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,Xn ∈ T nδ ] ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)), (38)
where R(D) is the point-to-point rate-distortion function for PX , and o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and
n→∞.
From Lemma 1, we see that the expected value of
∑2nRC
j=1 ξj,zn is bounded above by approximately 2
n(RC−R(D)).
Moreover, since a condition of the theorem being proved is that R < R(D), it follows that τn2n(RC−R) is
exponentially larger than 2n(RC−R(D)). Therefore, (37) is concerned with the probability that a sum of 2nRC
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables is exponentially far away from its mean. Such a probability decays at a doubly
exponential rate, as the following Chernoff bound will imply.
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Lemma 2. If Xm is a sequence of i.i.d. Bern(p) random variables, then
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤
(e·m·p
k
)k
. (39)
Proof: The proof follows some of the usual steps for establishing Chernoff bounds.
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤ min
λ>0
e−λk
m∏
i=1
E[eλXi ] (40)
= min
λ>0
e−λk(p · eλ + 1− p)m (41)
≤ min
λ>0
e−λk(p · eλ + 1)m (42)
≤ min
λ>0
e−λkempe
λ
(43)
Substituting the minimizer λ∗ = ln( kmp ) gives the desired bound.
Using the bound on E[ξj,zn ] from Lemma 1, we can apply Lemma 2 to the probability in (37) by identifying
m = 2nRC (44)
p ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)) (45)
k = τn2
n(RC−R). (46)
This gives
P
[ 2nRC∑
j=1
ξj,zn > τn2
n(RC−R)
]
≤ 2−nα2nβ , (47)
where
α = R(D)−R− o(1) (48)
β = RC −R− o(1). (49)
For small enough δ and large enough n, both α and β are positive and bounded away from zero, and (47) vanishes
doubly exponentially fast. Consequently, the expression in (37) vanishes, completing the proof of Theorem 2.
One can readily establish the following corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. If R < RC and R < R(D), then
lim
n→∞ECx
[
min
(n,Cx,R) codes
P[d(Xn(J), Y n) ≥ D]
]
= 1. (50)
The interlude is now complete, and we can return to the achievability proof of Theorem 1.
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B. Likelihood encoder
Earlier, we asserted that a scheme similar to random binning might give rise to an induced distribution PXn|M=m
that could be approximated by drawing a codeword uniformly from a random codebook. Then we could apply
Corollary 1 to our problem by identifying (RC, R) with (R0, RL). Although it is possible that an encoder using
random binning might yield this distribution, we turn instead to a likelihood encoder with a random codebook
because it brings considerable clarity to the induced distributions involved.
Consider a codebook c = {xn(m, k)} consisting of 2n(R+R0) sequences from Xn. The likelihood encoder of [7]
for lossless reconstruction and for this codebook is a stochastic encoder defined by
PM |XnK(m|xn, k) ∝
n∏
i=1
1{xi = xi(m, k)}, (51)
where ∝ indicates that appropriate normalization is required.2 The merit of using a likelihood encoder with
a random codebook is that the resulting system-induced joint distribution of (Xn,M,K), namely PXnMK =
PXnPKPM |XnK , can be shown to be close to an idealized distribution QXnMK defined by
QXnMK(x
n,m, k) , 2−n(R+R0)
n∏
i=1
1{xi = xi(m, k)}. (52)
More precisely, one can use the soft covering lemma [8, Lemma IV.1] to prove the following.
Lemma 3. Let C = {Xn(m, k)}, (m, k) ∈ [2nR]× [2nR0 ] be a random codebook with each codeword drawn
independently according to
∏n
i=1 PX . If R > H(X), then
lim
n→∞EC
∥∥PXnMK −QXnMK∥∥TV = 0, (53)
where the expectation is with respect to the random codebook and ‖·‖TV is total variation distance.
Proof: From the definition of PXnMK and QXnMK we have PM |XnK = QM |XnK . Using this fact, we have
EC
∥∥PXnMK −QXnMK∥∥TV (a)= EC∥∥PXnK −QXnK∥∥TV (54)
= EC
∥∥PXnPK −QXn|KPK∥∥TV (55)
= 2−nR0
2nR0∑
k=1
EC
∥∥PXn −QXn|K=k∥∥TV, (56)
where (a) uses Property 1c. Since R > H(X), the soft covering lemma implies that the summands vanish3:
lim
n→∞EC
∥∥PXn −QXn|K=k∥∥TV = 0. (57)
Without getting into the details of the soft covering lemma, it is worthwhile to briefly summarize the main idea. The
lemma, which is expounded upon in [8], i The soft covering lemma applies to the current proof because QXn|K=k
2In the rare case that no codeword is equal to the source sequence, an arbitrary index can be chosen.
3Furthermore, they vanish uniformly for all k ∈ [2nR0 ].
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is the output distribution induced by a memoryless channel acting on a random codebook of size 2nR, and PXn is
an i.i.d. distribution. Since we are considering lossless communication in this section, the relevant channel is the
noiseless identity channel, and the relevant rate condition is R > H(X).
Lemma 3 and the definition of total variation distance allow us to analyze the probability in (13) as if QXnMK
were the true system-induced joint distribution instead of PXnMK . This is important because QXn|M=m is, as
desired, uniform over a random codebook of size 2nR0 :
QXn|M=m = Unif{Xn(m, 1), . . . , Xn(m, 2nR0)}. (58)
To see the role of QXn|M=m, first denote (for the sake of brevity) the event
E = {d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ D(RL)− ε}. (59)
Our objective is to show that when RL < R0, Nodes A and B can force the eavesdropper to incur distortion D(RL),
i.e., there exists a sequence of codes that ensures (13).
Taking the expectation of (13) with respect to a random codebook, we have
EC
[
min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PPXnM [E ]
]
(a)
= EC
[
min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PQXnM [E ]
]
+ o(1) (60)
= EC
[
min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
E
[
PQXnM [E|M ]
]]
+ o(1) (61)
(b)
= EM EC
[
min
mH(x
n),zn(mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PQXn|M [E|M ]
]
+ o(1). (62)
In step (a), we use Lemma 3 to change the underlying distribution from PXnM to QXnM with vanishing penalty.
Step (b) uses the fact that M and C are independent under QXnM . These steps bring us to the problem considered
in the recent interlude: we must show that the henchman and the eavesdropper cannot design a code that achieves
distortion D(RL) for the “source” QXn|M=m.
Suppose that we are in the regime RL < R0. The expression in (62) is exactly what is addressed by Corollary 1,
because the conditional distribution QXn|M=m corresponds to selecting a codeword uniformly from a random
codebook of size 2nR0 (as noted in (58)), and RL is the rate of the message sent from the “encoder” (henchman) to
the “decoder” (eavesdropper). Also, note that we are invoking the corollary with D = D(RL)−ε; thus, RL < R(D)
is satisfied. Hence, Corollary 1 gives
lim
n→∞EC
[
min
mH(x
n),zn(mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PQXn|M=m [E|M = m]
]
= 1. (63)
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Xn A B Y n
K ∈ [2nR0 ]
Eve
M ∈ [2nR]
Fig. 5: Lossy communication. Secrecy is measured by the minimum distortion in a list of reconstruction sequences
{Zn(1), . . . , Zn(2nRL)} that the eavesdropper produces. There are two distortion functions at play, dB(x, y) and dE(x, z).
The likelihood encoder also provides the required lossless communication between Nodes A and B; it is straight-
forward to show that (53) implies vanishing probability of error if the decoder is defined by g(m, k) = xn(m, k).
Indeed,
EC P[Xn 6= X̂n] = EC PPXnMK [Xn 6= Xn(M,K)] (64)
(a)
= EC PQXnMK [X
n 6= Xn(M,K)] + o(1) (65)
= 0 + o(1), (66)
where step (a) follows from Lemma 3 and the definition of total variation distance.
We can conclude that there exists a codebook such that the associated likelihood encoder ensures (13) and lossless
communication, because both hold when averaged over random codebooks. This completes the achievability portion
of the proof of Theorem 1.
VI. LOSSY COMMUNICATION
We now generalize the problem to allow distortion at the legitimate receiver. As depicted in Figure 5, the receiver
produces a reconstruction sequence Y n, whose distortion is measured by d(Xn, Y n). Since there are two distortion
measures (one for the receiver and one for the eavesdropper), we will distinguish them by using subscripts B and
E.
Definition 5. The tuple (R,R0, RL, DB, DE) is achievable if there exists a sequence of (n,R,R0) codes such that
∀ε > 0,
1) Lossy communication:
P
[
dB(X
n, Y n) ≤ DB + ε
]
n→∞−−−−→ 1. (67)
2) List secrecy:
min
L(m):|L|≤2nRL
P
[
min
zn∈L(M)
dE(X
n, zn) ≥ DE − ε
]
n→∞−−−−→ 1. (68)
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Note that the decoder of a (n,R,R0) code for lossy communication is a (possibly stochastic) decoder PY n|MK .
As with the lossless version of problem, we can reformulate Definition 5 in terms of a rate-limited henchman. The
henchman formulation for the lossy communication setting is exactly described by Figure 2 (with X̂n replaced by
Y n).
The optimal tradeoff between the various rates and distortions is the following.
Theorem 3. Given a source distribution PX and distortion functions dB(x, y) and dE(x, z), the closure of achievable
tuples (R,R0, RL, DB, DE) is the set of tuples satisfying
R ≥ I(X;Y )
DB ≥ E dB(X,Y )
DE ≤
D(RL) if RL < R0min{D(RL), D(RL −R0, PXY )} if RL ≥ R0
(69)
for some PXY = PXPY |X , where D(·, PXY ) is the point-to-point distortion-rate function with side information
channel PY |X to the encoder and decoder:
D(R,PXY ) , min
PZ|XY :R≥I(X;Z|Y )
E dE(X,Z). (70)
When RL < R0, the eavesdropper’s distortion is at least D(RL), just as it was when we considered lossless
communication. This should not be surprising in light of the previous section, since less information is being
revealed to the eavesdropper (the communication rate between Nodes A and B is lower). As before, the henchman
can simply use a point-to-point rate-distortion code to achieve D(RL).
The more interesting regime is when RL ≥ R0, i.e., the list rate (equivalently, the henchman’s rate) is greater or
equal to the rate of secret key. In this case, Theorem 3 says that a communication scheme can be designed such
that the eavesdropper’s distortion cannot be less than
min{D(RL), DY (RL −R0)}. (71)
To see why these are the relevant distortions, consider the following. As we just mentioned, the henchman and
the eavesdropper can always ignore the message M and use a point-to-point code to achieve D(RL). Alternatively,
when RL ≥ R0, the henchman can first use part of the rate RL to communication the secret key to the eavesdropper.
Then, roughly speaking, the henchman and eavesdropper effectively share side information Y n (since they both
know M and K perfectly and can mimic the decoder), and can use the remaining rate RL−R0 to achieve distortion
D(RL − R0, PXY ). Thus, one implication of Theorem 3 is that the henchman benefits from sending information
about the secret key only if he describes it entirely; there is no benefit to communicating just part of the key to the
eavesdropper.
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VII. CONVERSE (LOSSY COMMUNICATION)
We now present the converse proof for Theorem 3. In the regime R0 > RL, the converse is the same as when we
required lossless communication. Nodes A and B (the legitimate parties) cannot force distortion greater than D(R)
with high probability because the henchman and the eavesdropper can always ignore the public message M and
simply use a good rate-distortion code to achieve distortion D(R) with high probability. Note that this converse is
“strong” in the sense that the probability of eavesdropper distortion being greater than D(R) is not just bounded
away from unity, it is actually vanishing. To be explicit, observe that if RL < R0 and DE > D(R), then the
expression in (68) vanishes for all ε < DE −D(R). This follows from the achievability portion of point-to-point
rate-distortion theory.
When RL ≥ R0, the henchman’s rate is high enough that he can communicate the secret key to the eavesdropper
and still have leftover rate RL − R0. Since the henchman and the eavesdropper both know M and K, they can
mimic the decoder of Node B and produce side information Y n. Notice that we have made two assumptions: the
henchman knows the secret key, and the receiver uses a deterministic decoder. However, if the henchman were not
able to determine the secret key exactly, then multiple keys would correspond to the same source sequence, which
means that the decoder would effectively be stochastic. Thus, we are making just one assumption: that the decoder
is deterministic. This assumption is valid because a stochastic decoder cannot be used to increase the eavesdropper’s
distortion. Indeed, if we consider the list formulation of the problem, we see that eavesdropper’s performance is
completely determined by Xn and M alone; the output of Node B does not play a role.4
So far, we have that the henchman and the eavesdropper share side information Y n equal to the receiver’s
reconstruction. Ideally, we would like to claim that (Xn, Y n) are jointly i.i.d. according to some distribution
PXY and use the achievability portion of rate-distortion theory with side information at the encoder and decoder.
Unfortunately, we cannot even claim that with high probability (Xn, Y n) are jointly typical according to some
PXY because that is only guaranteed when Nodes A and B are using a nearly optimal rate-distortion code (i.e.,
one that operates near the rate-distortion tradeoff boundary). Instead, we rely on a different property of (Xn, Y n)
that will be given shortly in Lemma 5.
We will describe the henchman and eavesdropper’s scheme in terms of the joint type of (Xn, Y n); to do this,
we require the following straightforward extension of the type-covering lemma [10, Lemma 9.1] that accounts for
side information (proof omitted). Regarding notation, T nX denotes the set of sequences whose types coincide with
a given distribution PX , and T (Xn) denotes the set of all joint types on sequences in Xn.
Lemma 4. Let τ > 0 and r ≥ 0. Fix a joint type PXY ∈ T (Xn × Yn), and let yn ∈ T nY . For n ≥ n0(τ), there
exists a codebook C(yn, PXY ) ⊆ Zn such that
4Note that this would not be the case if we were considering distortion functions of the form dE(x, y, z) instead of dE(x, z).
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1)
1
n
log |C(yn, PXY )| ≤ r. (72)
2) For all xn such that (xn, yn) ∈ T nXY ,
min
zn∈C(yn,PXY )
d(xn, zn) ≤ D(r, PXY ) + τ (73)
We also require the following lemma from [11].
Lemma 5 ([11, Theorem 7]). Consider any sequence of rate-distortion codes with rate ≤ R. Then
lim sup
n→∞
I(TXnY n) ≤ R a.s., (74)
where TXnY n denotes the type of (Xn, Y n) and I(·) is the mutual information.
Now we can begin the converse proof for the regime RL ≥ R0. Consider an achievable tuple (R,R0, RL, DB, DE).
By the same argument that was used in the regime RL < R0, we must have DE ≤ D(RL) because the henchman
and the eavesdropper can always ignore the public message and use a good rate-distortion code to describe Xn.
Let ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Define a set An of joint distributions on X × Y by
An ,

QXY : IQ(X;Y ) ≤ R+ ε
EQ dB(X,Y ) ≤ DB + ε
‖QX − PX‖TV ≤ ε
 . (75)
We first show that
lim
n→∞P[TXnY n ∈ An] = 1, (76)
where TXnY n denotes the type of (Xn, Y n). This can be proved by combining the following three facts:
1) From Lemma 5, we have
lim
n→∞P[I(TXn,Y n) ≤ R+ ε] = 1. (77)
2) From the definition of achievability and the equality dB(xn, yn) = ETxnyn dB(x, y), we have
lim
n→∞P[ETXnY n dB(x, y) ≤ D + ε] = 1. (78)
3) From the weak law of large numbers, we have
lim
n→∞P[‖TXn − PX‖TV ≤ ε] = 1. (79)
With (76) in hand, choose n large enough so that
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1) The eavesdropper cannot reconstruct with low distortion (this is an assumption of achievability):
max
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
P
[
dE(X
n, zn(M,MH)) < DE − ε
]
< ε. (80)
2)
P[TXnY n ∈ An] ≥ ε (81)
3) Lemma 4 is satisfied with τ = ε and r = RL −R0.
4) The number of bits needed to express the joint type is negligible:
1
n
|X ||Y| log(n+ 1) ≤ ε. (82)
To compress xn using side information yn, the henchman first describes the joint type of (xn, yn), then transmits
the index of xn in the codebook C(yn, Txn,yn) that is guaranteed by Lemma 4. The description of the joint type only
uses additional rate ε because the size of T (Xn×Yn) is bounded by (n+1)|X ||Y| and (82) is satisfied. Therefore,
for a given source sequence xn and side information sequence yn, the henchman is able to send a message at rate
(RL −R0) + ε such that the eavesdropper can produce zn with distortion
dE(x
n, zn) ≤ D(RL −R0 + ε, Txnyn) + ε. (83)
Now define
Q∗XY , argmax
Q∈An
D(RL −R0 + ε,Q). (84)
From (81), we see that with probability at least ε, the henchman and the eavesdropper can achieve distortion
dE(X
n, Zn) ≤ D(RL −R0 + ε, TXnY n) + ε (85)
≤ D(RL −R0 + ε,Q∗XY ) + ε (86)
Therefore, in view of (80), we can bound DE:
DE
(a)
≤ D(RL −R0 + ε,Q∗XY ) + 2ε (87)
(b)
≤ D(RL −R0 + ε, PXQ∗Y |X) + 2ε+ o(ε). (88)
Step (a) follows from (80). Step (b) is due to ‖Q∗X − PX‖TV < ε and the fact that the rate-distortion function is
continuous in PX with respect to total variation distance (e.g., see [12]). Because Q∗XY ∈ An, we can also bound
R and DB. First, we have
R ≥ I(Q∗XY )− ε (89)
(a)
≥ I(PXQ∗Y |X)− ε− o(ε), (90)
where (a) is due to the continuity of mutual information with respect to total variation distance. Next, we have
DB ≥ EQ∗XY dB(X,Y )− ε (91)
(a)
≥ EPXQ∗Y |X dB(X,Y )− ε− o(ε), (92)
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where (a) uses Property 1c of total variation.
Assimilating the bounds that we have established, we can conclude that any achievable tuple (R,R0, RL, DB, DE)
lies in the region
Sε ,
⋃
PY |X

(R,R0, RL, DB, DE) : R ≥ I(X;Y )− o(ε)
DB ≥ E dB(X,Y )− o(ε)
DE ≤ min{D(RL), D(RL −R0 + ε, PY |X) + o(ε)}
 . (93)
Since this holds for all ε > 0, we have
(R,R0, RL, DB, DE) ∈
⋂
ε>0
Sε. (94)
The region in (94) is equal to the region in Theorem 3 (subject to RL ≥ R0), completing the converse proof.
VIII. ACHIEVABILITY (LOSSY COMMUNICATION)
In this section, we prove the achievability portion of Theorem 3, the lossy communication counterpart to Theorem 1.
The skeleton of the proof is similar to the one presented in Section V, but we will need some enhanced versions
of some of the components.
As in the lossless setting, we can view the henchman and the eavesdropper as the sender and receiver in a rate-limited
system with side information M (i.e., the public message) available to both parties. The correlation between the side
information and the source sequence Xn will govern the performance; therefore, we are interested in PXn|M=m
since this is the effective source distribution after accounting for common side information. As before, the encoder
at Node A determines PXn|M=m entirely. In Section V, we were motivated by the effect of random binning (which
we later replaced with a likelihood encoder for ease of analysis). However, instead of simply randomly binning Xn
and using K to hide the location within the bin, we now want to first perform lossy compression using a codebook
of sequences from Yn, followed by a random binning of the codebook. Roughly speaking, this process results in
a distribution PXn|M=m that corresponds to selecting a yn sequence uniformly from a random codebook of size
2nR0 , then passing that sequence through a memoryless channel
∏
PX|Y . The justification for this assertion will
become clear when we use a likelihood encoder later on; for now, we study the subproblem that just surfaced: lossy
compression of a noisy version of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook.
A. Lossy compression of a noisy version of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook
Consider a codebook cy = {yn(1), . . . , yn(2nRC)} consisting of 2nRC sequences in Yn. Select a codeword uniformly
at random from cy and denote it by yn(J), where J ∼ Unif[2nRC ]. Pass yn(J) through a memoryless channel∏
PX|Y to produce a sequence Xn. An encoder describes Xn using a noiseless link of rate R, and a decoder
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Y n(J) PX|Y Enc. Dec. Zn
Cy
Xn R
Fig. 6: Lossy compression of a noisy version of a codeword drawn uniformly from a random codebook Cy =
{Y n(1), . . . , Y n(2nRC)}. Both the encoder and decoder know the codebook Cy. The encoder describes Xn, the output of
a memoryless channel
∏
PX|Y whose input is a randomly chosen codeword Y n(J), where J ∼ Unif[2nRC ].
estimates it with a reconstruction sequence Zn (incurring distortion d(Xn, Zn)). Both the encoder and decoder
know the codebook cy, and together they constitute a (n, cy, R) code. The setup is shown in Figure 6 for a random
codebook Cy.
The following theorem generalizes Theorem 2 (to recover that theorem, set Y = X).
Theorem 4. Fix PXY , R, RC and D. Let Cy be a random codebook of 2nRC codewords, each drawn independently
according to
∏n
i=1 PY (yi). Let τn be any sequence that converges to zero sub-exponentially fast (i.e., τn = 2
−o(n)).
If
R < min{R(D), RY (D) +RC}, (95)
then with high probability it is impossible to achieve distortion D in the sense that
lim
n→∞PCy
[
max
(n,Cy,R) codes
P[d(Xn, Zn) ≤ D] > τn
]
= 0. (96)
The function RY (D) is the rate-distortion function with side information:
RY (D) = min
PZ|XY :E d(X,Z)≤D
I(X;Z|Y ). (97)
Before diving into the proof, let us briefly justify why the regime in (95) is the one of interest. First, observe
that whenever R ≥ R(D) is satisfied, distortion D can be achieved by simply using a regular point-to-point rate
distortion code to describe Xn. Second, whenever R ≥ RY (D)+RC holds, distortion D can be achieved in roughly
the following manner. The encoder first identifies a codeword in Cy that is jointly typical with Xn (according to
PXY ) and sends the index of the codeword using rate RC. The codeword is then treated as side information, which
allows the encoder to describe Xn using rate RY (D). So we see that (95) is actually necessary for (96) to hold.
Proof: We follow the basic rubric of Section V, making modifications where they are needed.
Fixing PXY , we first restrict (Xn, Y n(J)) to be jointly typical by writing
P[d(Xn, Zn) ≤ D] ≤ P[d(Xn, Zn) ≤ D,A] + P[Ac], (98)
October, 2014 DRAFT
23
where A denotes the event {(Xn, Y n(J)) ∈ T nδ (X,Y )}. Note that the second term in (98) vanishes in the limit
for any δ > 0 since (Xn, Y n(J)) is i.i.d. according to PXY .
Continuing exactly as in Section V, we have
max
(n,Cy,R) codes
P[d(Xn, Zn) ≤ D,A] ≤ 2nR max
zn∈Zn
P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,A] (99)
= 2nR max
zn∈Zn
EJ P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,A|Y n(J)] (100)
= 2−n(RC−R) max
zn∈Zn
2nRC∑
j=1
P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,A|Y n(j)] (101)
Denote the terms in the sum by ζj,zn :
ζj,zn , P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,A|Y n(j)] (102)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
n∏
i=1
PX|Y (xi|Yi(j)) · 1{d(xn, zn) ≤ D, (xn, Y n(j)) ∈ Tδ} (103)
Continuing in the manner of Section V leads us to
P
[
max
(n,Cy,R) codes
P[d(Xn, Zn) ≤ D,A] > τn
]
≤ |Z|n max
zn∈Zn
P
[ 2nRC∑
j=1
ζj,zn > τn2
n(RC−R)
]
, (104)
As with the ξj,zn defined in Section V (Eq. (35)), the ζj,zn are i.i.d. due to the nature of the random codebook;
however, they are no longer Bernoulli random variables. The following lemma, a straightforward generalization of
Lemma 1, shows that ζj,zn is bounded above by 2−n(RY (D)−o(1)) with probability one. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 6. Fix PXY and yn ∈ Yn. If Xn is distributed according to
∏n
i=1 PX|Y=yi , then for any z
n,
P
[
d(Xn, zn) ≤ D, (Xn, yn) ∈ T nδ
∣∣Y n = yn] ≤ 2−n(RY (D)−o(1)), (105)
where o(1) is a term that vanishes as δ → 0 and n→∞.
As mentioned, Lemma 6 implies
ζj,zn ∈ [0, 2−n(RY (D)−o(1))]. (106)
In addition to bounding the range of ζj,zn we can also bound its expected value. In fact, the bound is the same as
for ξj,zn .
ECyζj,zn = ECy P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,A |Y n(j)] (107)
≤ ECy P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,Xn ∈ Tδ |Y n(j)] (108)
= P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,Xn ∈ Tδ] (where Xn ∼
∏
PX) (109)
(a)
≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)), (110)
where (a) is due to Lemma 1.
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We are now ready to apply a Chernoff bound to the probability in (104). First, we extend the Chernoff bound in
Lemma 2 to random variables taking values on the interval [0, a] instead of just binary random variables.
Corollary 2. If Xm is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables on the interval [0, a] with E[Xi] = p, then
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤
(e·m·p
k
)k/a
. (111)
Proof: We start by proving the case a = 1. To begin, we claim that if X ∈ [0, 1] and Y ∈ {0, 1} are random
variables such that E[X] = E[Y ] and f : [0, 1]→ R is convex, then
E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )]. (112)
To see this, observe that for x ∈ [0, 1],
f(x) ≤ xf(1) + (1− x)f(0). (113)
Taking expectations gives
E[f(X)] ≤ E[X]f(1) + (1− E[X])f(0) (114)
= E[Y ]f(1) + (1− E[Y ])f(0) (115)
= E[f(Y )], (116)
verifying the claim. Now, since f(x) = eλx is convex, the inequality E[eλY ] ≤ E[eλX ] holds and can be applied
to the proof of Lemma 2 at (40).
With the case a = 1 shown, we now consider any a > 0. If we let Yi = 1aXi ∈ [0, 1], then the previous case
applies and we have
P
[ m∑
i=1
Xi > k
]
≤ P
[ m∑
i=1
aYi >
k
a
]
(117)
≤
(e·m·E[Y1]
k/a
)k/a
(118)
=
(e·m·p
k
)k/a
. (119)
Using the support bound and the expected value bound in (106) and (110), we can apply Corollary 2 to the
probability in (104) by identifying
m = 2nRC (120)
a = 2−n(RY (D)−o(1)) (121)
p ≤ 2−n(R(D)−o(1)) (122)
k = τn2
n(RC−R). (123)
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This gives
P
[ 2nRC∑
j=1
ζj,zn > τn2
n(RC−R)
]
≤ 2−nα2nβ , (124)
where
α = R(D)−R− o(1) (125)
β = RC +RY (D)−R− o(1). (126)
For small enough δ and large enough n, both α and β are positive and bounded away from zero, and (124) vanishes
doubly exponentially fast. Consequently, the expression in (104) vanishes, completing the proof of Theorem 4.
The following corollary to Theorem 4 is immediate, and, as in Section V, will serve as the bridge between the
subproblem we have been considering and the henchman problem.
Corollary 3. Fix PXY . If R < min{R(D), RY (D) +RC}, then
lim
n→∞ECy
[
min
(n,Cy,R) codes
P[d(Xn, Zn) ≥ D]
]
= 1. (127)
B. Likelihood encoder
Returning to the henchman problem, we follow the basic structure of Section V. Fixing PY |X (and thus a joint
distribution PXY ), consider a codebook c = {yn(m, k)} of 2n(R+R0) sequences from Yn and define a likelihood
encoder for this codebook by
PM |XnK(m|xn, k) ∝
n∏
i=1
PX|Y (xi|yi(m, k)), (128)
where ∝ indicates that appropriate normalization is required. The distribution PXnMK induced by using this encoder
with a random codebook is intimately related to an idealized distribution QXnMK defined by
QXnMK(x
n,m, k) , 2−n(R+R0)
n∏
i=1
PX|Y (xi|yi(m, k)). (129)
Indeed, just as in Lemma 3, one can use the soft covering lemma to show that if R > I(X;Y ), then
lim
n→∞EC
∥∥PXnMK −QXnMK∥∥TV = 0, (130)
where C is a random codebook with each codeword drawn independently according to ∏ni=1 PY .
Inspecting QXnMK reveals that QXn|M=m is exactly the distribution that was addressed in the recent interlude.
To see this, observe that QXnK|M=m is the joint distribution that arises from selecting a codeword uniformly from
a codebook of size 2nR0 and passing it through a memoryless channel
∏
PX|Y . To be explicit,
QXn|M (xn|m) = 2−nR0
2nR0∑
k=1
n∏
i=1
PX|Y (xi|Yi(m, k)). (131)
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Proceeding with the analysis of the eavesdropper’s distortion, first denote the event
E = {d(Xn, zn(M,MH)) ≥ pi(RL, R0, PY |X)− ε}, (132)
where
pi(RL, R0, PY |X) ,
D(RL) if R0 > RLmin{D(RL), DY (RL −R0)} if R0 ≤ RL (133)
The purpose of pi(·) is to treat the cases RL < R0 and RL ≥ R0 concurrently.
Taking the expectation of (68) with respect to a random codebook, we have
EC
[
min
mH(x
n,m),zn(m,mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PPXnM [E ]
]
= EM EC
[
min
mH(x
n),zn(mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PQXn|M [E|M ]
]
+ o(1). (134)
From (131), we see that the expression in (134) is exactly what is addressed by Corollary 3 after identifying
(R0, RL) with (RC, R). Note that we are invoking the corollary with D = pi(RL, R0, PY |X)− ε, which means that
RL < min{R(D), RY (D) +R0}. (135)
Thus, we have
lim
n→∞EC
[
min
mH(x
n),zn(mH):
|MH|≤2nRL
PQXn|M=m [E|M = m]
]
= 1. (136)
Therefore, we can conclude that there exists a codebook such that the associated likelihood encoder ensures (68),
because (68) holds when averaged over random codebooks.
We now complete the proof of achievability by showing that the likelihood encoder can be used to achieve distortion
E dB(X,Y ) at the legitimate receiver (this is also done in [7]). To do this, Node B uses a deterministic decoder
that simply produces the codeword indexed by (m, k), i.e.,
PY n|MK(yn|m, k) = 1{yn = yn(m, k)}. (137)
Defining QXnMKY n , QXnMKPY n|MK , we can write
EC
∥∥PXnY n −QXnY n∥∥TV (a)≤ EC∥∥PXnMKPY n|MK −QXnMKPY n|MK∥∥TV (138)
(b)
= EC
∥∥PXnMK −QXnMK∥∥TV (139)
(c)→ 0, (140)
where (a) and (b) follow from Properties 1d and 1c, and (c) is due to (130). Now notice that ECQXnY n is exactly
the product distribution
∏n
i=1 PXY (a fact which is straightforward to verify). Therefore, by (140) and the weak
law of large numbers, we have
EC P
[
dB(X
n, Y n) > E dB(X,Y ) + ε
]
= EC PQXnY n
[
dB(X
n, Y n) > E dB(X,Y ) + ε
]
+ o(1) (141)
= o(1) (142)
This completes the achievability portion of the proof of Theorem 3.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first bound P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D] and resolve the event Xn ∈ T nδ afterward. We use the V-shell notation from the
method of types [9]: for a stochastic matrix VZ|X , the set of zn sequences having conditional type V is denoted
by T nV (xn). Note that all pairs (xn, zn) satisfying zn ∈ T nV (xn) have the same joint type (denoted by Txnzn ).
Diving in, we have
P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D] =
∑
xn∈Xn
PXn(x
n)1{d(xn, zn) ≤ D} (143)
(a)
=
∑
VX|Z
∑
xn∈T nV (zn)
PXn(x
n)1{d(xn, zn) ≤ D} (144)
(b)
=
∑
VX|Z
∑
xn∈T nV (zn)
2−n(D(Txn ||PX)+H(Txn ))1{ETxnznd(X,Z) ≤ D} (145)
(c)
≤
∑
VX|Z :
T nV (zn)6=∅
2nH(Txn |Tzn )2−n(D(Txn ||PX)+H(Txn ))1{ETxnznd(X,Z) ≤ D} (146)
=
∑
VX|Z :
T nV (zn)6=∅
2−n(I(Txnzn )+D(Txn ||PX))1{ETxnznd(X,Z) ≤ D} (147)
(d)
≤ exp
{
− n min
V :ETxnzn d(X,Z)≤D
[I(Txnzn) +D(Txn ||PX)] +O(log n)
}
. (148)
In step (a), we partition the set Xn according to the conditional type of xn given zn. Step (b) follows by observing
that the summands only depend on the joint type of (xn, zn). Step (c) uses a bound on the size of TV (zn), and
step (d) follows from the fact that the number of conditional types is polynomial in n.
We can continue by lower bounding the first term in the (normalized) exponent of (148):
min
V :ETxnzn d(X,Z)≤D
I(Txnzn) +D(Txn ||PX)
≥ min
zn
min
V :ETxnzn d(X,Z)≤D
I(Txnzn) +D(Txn ||PX) (149)
= min
QXZ :EQd(X,Z)≤D
IQ(X;Z) +D(QX ||PX) (150)
= min
QX
min
QZ|X :EQd(X,Z)≤D
IQ(X;Z) +D(QX ||PX) (151)
= min
QX
[R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX)], (152)
where R(D,QX) denotes the rate-distortion function for a source QX .
So far, we have shown that the following holds for all zn:
P[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D] ≤ exp{−n ·min
QX
[R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX)] +O(log n)}. (153)
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However, this is not quite the bound we seek; a simple example will reveal that it is possible to have
min
QX
[R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX)] < R(D). (154)
Indeed, consider PX ∼ Bern(p), p ∈ (D, 1/2) and QX ∼ Bern(q). After simplifying, we find that
R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX) = q log 1
p
+ (1− q) log 1
1− p − h(D). (155)
Minimizing this expression over q ∈ [0, 1] gives
min
QX
[R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX)] = min
{
log
1
p
, log
1
1− p
}
− h(D) (156)
< h(p)− h(D) (157)
= R(D). (158)
To resolve this issue, we introduce the event Xn ∈ T nδ into the expression we want to bound. Modifying the steps
above accordingly, we have
− 1
n
logP[d(Xn, zn) ≤ D,Xn ∈ T nδ ] ≥ min
QX :‖QX−PX‖TV<δ
R(D,QX) +D(QX ||PX)−O( lognn ) (159)
(a)
≥ min
QX :‖QX−PX‖TV<δ
R(D,QX)−O( lognn ) (160)
(b)
= R(D)−O(δ log 1δ )−O( lognn ) (161)
= R(D)− o(1), (162)
where step (a) is due to the non-negativity of relative entropy and step (b) follows from the uniform continuity of
the rate-distortion function with respect to total variation distance (e.g., [12]).
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